Creating Higher Burdens: The Presumption of State Protection in Democratic Countries by Liew, Jamie Chai Yun
Creating Higher Burdens: The Presumption  
of State Protection in Democratic Countries
Jamie Chai Yun Liew
Abstract
The author examines the burden on refugee claimants at 
the Immigration and Refugee Board in Canada to provide 
evidence that their home state cannot protect them . In par-
ticular, the paper discusses the growing trend of adjudica-
tors taking de facto judicial notice of the fact that a country 
is democratic to make the finding that there is state protec-
tion for claimants . The author argues that the practice of 
labelling countries as democratic and making state protec-
tion findings upon the finding is a biased and unhelpful 
practice when evaluating the issue of whether state protec-
tion exists . The paper discusses what “democracy” means 
and the problems associated with defining it . It will dis-
cuss how judicial notice of whether a state is democratic 
can affect an analysis of state protection in the example of 
claimants fleeing domestic abuse in Mexico .
Résumé
L’auteure examine la charge pesant sur les demandeurs 
d’asile à la Commission de l’immigration et du statut de 
réfugié du Canada de fournir la preuve que leur État d’ori-
gine ne peut pas les protéger . En particulier, le présent arti-
cle examine la tendance croissante des juges de faire auto-
matiquement le constat judiciaire du fait qu’un pays est 
démocratique pour arriver à la conclusion qu’il y a protec-
tion de l’État pour les demandeurs . L’auteure fait valoir que 
la pratique d’étiqueter des pays comme démocratiques et 
d’en tirer des conclusions quant à la protection de l’État est 
une pratique biaisée et inutile lorsqu’il s’agit d’évaluer la 
question à savoir si la protection de l’État existe . L’auteure 
aborde le sens de la « démocratie » et les problèmes liés à 
sa définition . Elle explique comment le constat judiciaire 
voulant qu’un État soit démocratique peut affecter une 
analyse de protection de l’État dans l’exemple des deman-
deurs d’asile fuyant la violence domestique au Mexique .
Introduction
In April 2009, Canada’s Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Jason Kenney, stated that asylum seekers’ 
applications from “liberal democracies” may be treated 
differently than those from totalitarian regimes .1 Minister 
Kenney has now gone further than making public state-
ments, and introduced a bill titled Balanced Refugee Reform 
Act in the House of Commons to amend the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) .2 This “reform” has been 
pushed through the Canadian parliamentary system at 
breakneck speed, with first reading taking place on March 
30, 2010, and receiving Royal Assent on June 29, 2010 .3
Among the “balanced reforms” is clause 12 of Bill C-11, 
which creates a new section in IRPA . The new section 
109 .1(1) of IRPA “provides that the Minister may desig-
nate by order, nationals of a country, a part of a country, 
or a class of nationals of a country, if the Minister is of the 
opinion that they meet criteria established in the regula-
tions .”4 This “designated countries of origin” clause essen-
tially allows the government to create a list of countries 
from which they deem refugees could not possibly come . 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada framed the new pro-
vision as follows:
Most Canadians recognize that there are places in the world 
where it is less likely for a person to be persecuted compared to 
other areas . Yet many people from these places try to claim asy-
lum in Canada, but are later found not to need protection .
This suggests that they may be using Canada’s asylum system to 
jump the queue . Too much time and too many resources are spent 
reviewing these unfounded claims .
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Designated countries of origin will include countries that do 
not normally produce refugees, that have a robust human rights 
record and offer strong state protection . States with strong demo-
cratic, judicial and accountability systems are likely to provide the 
necessary protection to their citizens .5
This amendment could open the door to allowing the 
government to diminish refugee claimants’ rights whether 
an individual is a bona fide refugee simply because of the 
country they are from . It would essentially allow the gov-
ernment to use certain criteria, such as whether a country is 
democratic, to determine whether or not a state could pro-
vide protection to its nationals . The new section also gives 
licence to use a particular bias when evaluating claims from 
“designated countries .”
The concept of the lack of state protection is central to 
defining who is a refugee . Indeed the impetus with creating 
protection for refugees is because a refugee is unable to seek 
protection from their home country . Hathaway states:
… the intention of the drafters was not to protect persons against 
any and all forms of even serious harm, but was rather to restrict 
refugee recognition to situations in which there was a risk of a type 
of injury that would be inconsistent with the basic duty of protec-
tion owed by a state to its own population . As a holistic reading 
of the refugee definition demonstrates, the drafters were not con-
cerned to respond to certain forms of harm per se, but were rather 
motivated to intervene only where the maltreatment anticipated 
was demonstrative of a breakdown of national protection .
… persecution may be defined as the sustained or systemic vio-
lation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state 
protection . A well-founded fear of persecution exists when one 
reasonably anticipates that remaining in the country may result 
in a form of serious harm which government cannot or will not 
prevent, including either “specific hostile acts or … an accumula-
tion of adverse circumstances such as discrimination existing in 
an atmosphere of insecurity and fear .”
[ … ]
In sum, persecution is most appropriately defined as the sustained 
or systemic failure of state protection in relation to one of the core 
entitlements which has been recognized by the international 
community .6
The question then becomes, how do we determine whether 
there is enough state protection afforded before the inter-
national duty of surrogate protection may be said to arise?
Hathaway notes that it is obvious that when a state is an 
agent of persecution, not only conducting the persecution, 
but also condoning or supporting it, the state is not affording 
state protection .7 Similarly, Hathaway writes that state pro-
tection is clearly not available when a state is unwilling to 
defend its citizens from harm . He states: “Beyond these acts 
of commission carried out by entities with which the state is 
formally or implicitly linked, persecution may also consist 
of either the failure or inability of a government effectively to 
protect the basic human rights of its populace .”8 Hathaway 
lists four situations where state protection not founded:
1 . Persecution committed by the state concerned;
2 . Persecution condoned by the state concerned;
3 . Persecution tolerated by the state concerned;
4 . Persecution not condoned or not tolerated by the 
state concerned but nevertheless present because 
the state either refuses or is unable to offer adequate 
protection .9
The Supreme Court of Canada in Ward also grappled with 
the proper test for determining the existence of effective 
state protection:
The issue that arises, then, is how, in a practical sense, a claimant 
makes proof of a state’s inability to protect its nationals as well as 
the reasonable nature of the claimant’s refusal actually to seek out 
this protection . On the facts of this case, proof on this point was 
unnecessary, as representatives of the state authorities conceded 
their inability to protect Ward . Where such an admission is not 
available, however, clear and convincing confirmation of a state’s 
inability to protect must be provided .10
Here, the Supreme Court of Canada created a presump-
tion of state protection . Essentially, the Court imposed a 
burden upon a refugee claimant to rebut a presumption that 
a state is unwilling or unable to protect a refugee claimant . 
In presenting a refugee claim, the onus was placed upon 
a claimant to show “clear and convincing” proof to rebut a 
presumption that their home state can provide protection .
In conducting evaluations, Canadian Courts have grap-
pled with what kinds of factors or tools they may use in 
making the assessment that a state has not or is unwilling 
or unable to provide state protection to an individual . One 
of the tools that Canadian Courts have increasingly relied 
upon is taking de facto judicial notice of whether the home 
country of a claimant is democratic or not . Courts have 
added a gloss to the presumption of state protection, by stat-
ing that the burden to rebut state protection is higher for 
those coming from democratic states . The Federal Court 
of Appeal in Kadenko brought the practice of recognizing 
whether a state is democratic or not, as an indicator to the 
level of state protection provided to claimants:
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When the state in question is a democratic state, as in the case at 
bar, the claimant must do more than simply show that he or she 
went to see some members of the police force and that his or her 
efforts were unsuccessful . The burden of proof that rests on the 
claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the level of dem-
ocracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state’s 
institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all 
the course of action open to him or her .11
In making this finding, the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Kadenko crafted a higher threshold that refugee claimants 
must meet in Canada since the Ward decision . No longer 
is the examination of whether there is state protection de 
novo or from a clean slate . The Kadenko decision gives the 
Immigration and Refugee Board (Board) and Federal Court 
judges licence to take judicial notice of the political struc-
ture of a country and to put the onus back on the claimant 
to prove that a state in question cannot protect them .
This paper aims to discuss whether the seminal decision 
in Kadenko, which links state protection to democracy, pro-
vides decision makers with an appropriate tool upon which 
to determine whether state protection is available for claim-
ants . It is argued that this precedent pushes the limits to 
what Board members and judges can give judicial notice to, 
and gives a biased and unhelpful perspective as to the true 
nature of state protection in any given country .
The paper will first give a brief overview of how Board 
members and the Federal Court are using the presumption 
of state protection in democratic countries . I will then dis-
cuss what “democracy” means and the problems associated 
with defining it . Finally, the paper will provide recommen-
dations that Board members and the Courts refrain from 
the knee-jerk reaction of relying on the categorization of 
whether a country is democratic to aid in their evaluation 
of whether a state can provide protection to a particular 
claimant .
Immigration and Refugee Board Propensity to Use 
Democracy Presumption
To give context to how the presumption of state protection 
in a democratic country is being applied by decision mak-
ers in refugee claims, this section will review recent cases 
of claimants from Mexico, with claims based on fear of 
domestic violence . The country of Mexico was chosen as 
there are a number of claims in Canada made by Mexican 
nationals, and because it has what is commonly described as 
a democratic political system . The case study of claimants 
who claim based on belonging to the social group of surviv-
ors of domestic violence is instructive because it is a vulner-
able group whose claims not only vary from individual to 
individual, but also can illustrate the problem with using a 
democracy presumption .
It is important to note that Canada and Mexico have 
cultivated a close relationship with each other . Mexico 
has been Canada’s partner in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) since 1994 .12 Since then, their 
relationship has strengthened significantly as Canada and 
Mexico are now among each other’s largest trading part-
ners . Canada has become one of Mexico’s major foreign 
investors with Mexico identified as a “priority market” for 
Export Development Canada (EDC) . Resident presence of 
EDC started in 2000 .13 While Mexico is the largest recipient 
of Canadian tourists destined for Latin America, Canada 
receives not only significant numbers of Mexican tourists, 
but also thousands of temporary workers .14
In recent years, relations between Canada’s Parliament 
and Mexico’s Congress have deepened with interparlia-
mentary meetings held in 2005 and 2006 to discuss a wide 
array of issues of common concern .15 In February 2009, the 
Canadian government also made a strategic shift in foreign 
policy by shifting foreign aid dollars towards the Americas . 
This move was touted as signalling a desire to be a bigger 
player in the hemisphere and an intention to make the 
Americas a foreign policy priority .16
Despite the close relations, and perhaps because of 
them, the government of Canada has recently signalled 
its perspective that refugees could not possibly come from 
Mexico .17 Indeed, Mexico has publicly defended its inter-
national reputation in Canada saying that they have control 
over the drug wars within their borders .18 In July 2009, the 
government imposed visa requirements on Mexicans travel-
ling to Canada overnight where previously no such require-
ment was needed .19 The government cited the need to stop 
the surge of refugee claims from Mexico as the reason .20
With the political context in mind, the following is an 
overview of recent published cases regarding Mexican 
claimants fearing domestic violence in which the Board has 
relied on the presumption of state protection in a democ-
racy to find that there is sufficient state protection for the 
claimant .
In the case of N .Q .C .,21 the claimant had been living with 
her boyfriend who, she later discovered, was a drug dealer . 
The claimant had been beaten by her boyfriend, and also 
received threats against her life . In evaluating the availabil-
ity of state protection, the board member stated that unless 
the state apparatus is in a complete breakdown, states are 
presumed to be capable of protecting their citizens and that 
the presumption cannot be reversed without “clear and con-
vincing” evidence of the state’s inability to provide protec-
tion .22 The Board followed the reasoning in Kadenko and 
reasoned that the burden of proof that rests on the claimant 
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is “directly proportional to the level of democracy in the 
state in question .”23 In evaluating the claimant’s home 
country of Mexico, the Board stated:
With respect to state protection, Mexico is a democracy with a 
functioning police force . Even if the police or some of them were 
agents of persecution, there is no evidence of a pervasive under-
mining of democratic institutions . In addition, there is evidence 
of state-run aid and protection available through non-police 
organizations … . 24
The Board concluded that while “the situation in Mexico 
is not perfect,” they found no “clear and convincing” evi-
dence that the Mexican government could not protect the 
claimant .25
In Cortes,26 the Board was evaluating a claim by a 
woman who was cohabiting with her boyfriend . Her boy-
friend increasingly became violent and abusive, and also 
isolated her totally from her family and friends . When the 
claimant escaped and moved to her sister’s home outside of 
the city, the claimant received threatening phone calls . In 
determining whether state protection would be provided for 
her, the Board found that the claimant failed to rebut the 
presumption of state protection in Mexico with clear and 
convincing evidence or that the “government is in chaos 
or disarray .”27 The Board provided in its reasons that “the 
claimant’s burden of proof is directly proportional to the 
level of democracy .”28 In describing Mexico as a democracy, 
the Board stated:
Mexico is a Federal Republic composed of 31 states in a federal 
district with an elected president and a bicameral legislature . In 
July of 2000, the voters elected President Vicente Fox Quesada of 
the Appliance for Change Coalition historic elections that observ-
ers judged to be free and fair . No government is expected to be 
able to protect all of its citizens at all times, nor is it expected to 
provide perfect protection .29
In Z .Y .A .30 the claimant had a relationship with a man 
who was emotionally and physically abusive . She ended the 
relationship and met another man with whom she had a child . 
Because of the continuing presence of her ex-boyfriend, her 
child’s father ended the relationship with the claimant, and 
after persistent requests to reconcile, the claimant recon-
ciled with her ex-boyfriend . The claimant claimed that her 
boyfriend resumed his abusive behaviour, and at the height 
of the abuse, raped her . The claimant fled to another city to 
live with family, but was located by her abuser, who threat-
ened her with a gun to come back to him . In finding that the 
claimant did not rebut the presumption of state protection, 
the Board relied on the democratic nature of the Mexican 
government:
Furthermore, Kadenko states that when the state in question is a 
democratic state, the claimant must do more than simply show 
that he or she went to see some member of the police force and 
that his or her efforts were unsuccessful . The burden of proof that 
rests on the claimant is, in a way, directly proportional to the 
level of democracy of the state in question . The more democratic 
the state’s institutions, the more the claimant must have done to 
exhaust all courses of action open to him or her . The claimant has 
not rebutted the presumption of state protection with clear and 
convincing proof as she is required to do .31
In Campos,32 the Board was dealing with a claim from a 
gay man who survived abuse from his former partner who 
was also a police officer . After suffering abuse, the claimant 
had broken up with his partner and had begun a relationship 
with another man . The claimant’s former partner confronted 
him about the new relationship, took him to a secluded place, 
and raped him . He had frequent encounters with his former 
partner, which led to physical altercations that also included 
his current partner . In commenting about whether state pro-
tection was available, the Board stated, “the presumption of 
state protection applies” and noted that “in the documentary 
evidence, it is indicated that Mexico is a constitutional dem-
ocracy with an independent judiciary .”33
In Sulvaran,34 the claimant was dating a police offi-
cer who harassed, raped, and physically abused her . In 
reviewing state protection, the Board relied upon Kadenko 
providing that the burden of proof to establish the absence 
of state protection is directly proportional to the level of 
democracy in the state in question .35 As well, the Board rea-
soned that except in situations of complete breakdown of 
state apparatus, the state is assumed to be capable of provid-
ing protection for citizens . Citing Ward, the Board held that 
only clear and convincing evidence can rebut the presump-
tion of state protection .36
In S .B .L .,37 the claimant was cohabiting with a man who 
not only liked to smoke and drink a lot, but also was posses-
sive, controlling, and abusive . He abused the claimant sex-
ually and physically, and threatened to kill her . The claimant 
tried to leave the relationship several times, but was always 
intimidated into returning . The police were called several 
times due to noise, but when they arrived, the claimant’s 
spouse would say things were fine . In fact, the claimant 
was almost killed by her spouse when he tried to shoot her . 
When discussing state protection, the Board held:
The panel finds that protection is adequate in the Federal 
District . She did not rebut, with clear and convincing proof, the 
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presumption that the democratically elected government in the 
Federal District is capable of providing protection for its citizens . 
There is no evidence that this government is dysfunctional or in 
disarray .38
In F .M .L .,39 the claimant had lived with her boyfriend 
but left him because of physical abuse . Aside from credibil-
ity concerns and efforts to seek state protection, the Board 
also found that the claimant failed to rebut with clear and 
convincing proof the presumption that the democratically 
elected government in Mexico is capable of providing pro-
tection for its citizens, and there was no evidence provided 
that the democracy is dysfunctional or that the government 
is in disarray .40
In F .C .F .,41 the claimant was fourteen years old when she 
began to cohabit with a man . When the claimant became 
pregnant, her partner was displeased and became physic-
ally abusive . Two of the claimant’s boyfriends were allegedly 
murdered by the man . In reviewing whether state protec-
tion is available, the Board provided almost identical rea-
soning as S .B .L . and F .M .L ., stating that the claimants failed 
to rebut with clear and convincing evidence the presump-
tion that the democratically elected government in Mexico 
is capable of providing protection and that there was no evi-
dence that the “democracy is dysfunctional or the govern-
ment is in disarray .”42
Other cases have relied on similar reasoning, relying 
on the findings in Kadenko and making pronouncements 
that Mexico is a democracy and therefore can afford state 
protection .43 These cases demonstrate how there is a grow-
ing trend amongst decision makers to truncate their analy-
sis with regard to whether state protection is available in 
a particular claim . Instead, decision makers reason that if 
a claimant is from a democratic country, there is a higher 
burden for the claimant to meet to rebut the presumption of 
state protection, ending their analysis there . 
Federal Court Acceptance of Kadenko Principle
Since the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Kadenko, it is 
not only the Board that has relied heavily upon the assump-
tion that if a country can be described as democratic, the 
heavier the burden upon a refugee claimant to show that 
state protection is not available . Essentially decision mak-
ers have held that where a state has what can be described 
as having a democratic system, that in itself constitutes 
“clear and convincing” evidence that there is effective state 
protection .44
The notion that the political makeup of a country can 
determine whether there is effective state protection has 
been upheld recently by the Federal Court of Appeal in 
Hinzman . The case of Hinzman involved an American 
member of the military seeking refugee status in Canada 
after his application for conscientious objector status in the 
military was rejected . In appealing his judicial review of 
the Board’s decision to deny him refugee status, one of the 
main issues was whether the United States could provide 
Mr . Hinzman with state protection . The Court of Appeal 
ruled against Mr . Hinzman with the following reasoning:
The United States is a democratic country with a system of checks 
and balances among its three branches of government, including 
an independent judiciary and constitutional guarantee of due pro-
cess . The appellants therefore bear a heavy burden in attempting 
to rebut the presumption that the United States is capable of pro-
tecting them and would be required to prove that they exhausted 
all the domestic avenues available to them without success before 
claiming refugee status in Canada .45
The Federal Court of Appeal recently not only supported 
Hinzman in Flores Carillo but also restated the principle 
from the Kadenko case, holding that a claimant from a 
democratic country will have a heavy burden when rebut-
ting the presumption of state protection .46
In returning to our case study of Mexican claimants who 
are survivors of domestic violence, the following section 
canvasses recent cases from the Federal Court .
In the case of Carillo47 where the claimant was in an 
abusive relationship suffering severe beatings from her boy-
friend, the Federal Court held: “The burden of proof that 
rests on the claimant is in a way directly proportional to 
the level of democracy in the state in question . The more 
democratic the state’s institutions, the more the claimant 
must have done to exhaust all the courses of action open to 
him or her .”48
In Flores,49 Justice Mosley of the Federal Court was 
reviewing a Board decision regarding a family of claimants 
fearing the former common-law partner of the principle 
applicant . Here, Justice Mosley, in finding no reviewable 
error in the Board’s reasoning on state protection, relied 
upon the presumption of state protection in democracies:
When that state is a democratic society, such as Mexico, albeit one 
facing significant challenges with corruption and other criminal-
ity, the quality of the evidence necessary to rebut the presumption 
will be higher . It is not enough for a claimant merely to show that 
his government has not always been effective at protecting per-
sons in his particular situation .50
Justice Lagace of the Federal Court in Gea51 was 
reviewing a decision of the Board involving a woman fleeing 
her former common-law spouse when he relied on previous 
jurisprudence using the presumption of state protection in 
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democracies . He stated that “it must be remembered that 
there is a presumption of state protection, especially in a 
democratic state” and listed jurisprudence relying on this 
principle .52 Justice Lagace accepted that the applicant has 
the burden of rebutting the presumption of state protection 
and held that the Board in Gea had considered the effective-
ness of state protection, and “on a general level, addressed 
the gaps or inconsistencies in Mexican state protection .”53
Justice Lagace took the opportunity to reiterate this 
analysis verbatim in the decision of Sanchez,54 another refu-
gee case involving a woman who was in an abusive relation-
ship with her former common-law partner .
The problem with this analysis is that it effectively with-
ers away the intended protection the refugee regime was 
intended to provide . If the Courts are to review state protec-
tion on a “general level” only, then the particular circum-
stances of claimants are no longer important .
This point was made in the case of Farias, where the 
Federal Court held that the Board’s analysis of state protec-
tion was too general, relying on other jurisprudence to say 
that a lack of analysis of a claimant’s personal situation is a 
reviewable error in the Board’s decision .55 Farias concerned 
a case of a woman who was in an abusive relationship with 
a senior government official in Mexico . In reviewing the 
decision to deny refugee status to the claimant, the Federal 
Court held that more than a finding that Mexico can provide 
protection is needed and a particularized analysis is war-
ranted .56 While the Court did not say so in this case, the 
principles enumerated suggest that decision makers cannot 
simply rely on the democratic nature of a country in deter-
mining whether state protection is available, but must exam-
ine the individual circumstances of the particular claimant 
to decide whether protection would be provided, regardless 
of which political system the country adheres to .
In Bautista,57 Justice Beaudry of the Federal Court was 
reviewing a decision by the Board involving a claimant who 
was abused by her ex-partner for approximately three years . 
The court noted that the “Board relied on its findings that 
Mexico is a functioning democracy”58 but held that the 
Board did not make a “complete analysis” of the evidence 
to determine whether Mexico is able or unable to protect its 
citizens .59 The judicial review was allowed, in part, for this 
reason .
In the case of Huerta,60 Justice Blanchard allowed the 
judicial review of a refugee decision wherein a claimant 
feared persecution at the hands of her common-law spouse . 
In summarizing the Board’s findings with respect to state 
protection, Justice Blanchard stated that the Board relied 
on documentary evidence to conclude that, “as a pro-
gressive democracy, Mexico can be said to be providing 
adequate though not necessarily perfect state protection 
to its citizens .”61 As well, Justice Blanchard noted that the 
Board found that the Applicant did not reasonably exhaust 
any course of action available to her prior to seeking inter-
national protection, concluding that state protection is 
available to the Applicant in Mexico .62 The Court was dis-
satisfied with the analysis of the Board holding that the 
Board failed to deal with the evidence, especially evidence 
that directly contradicted its findings .63
Similarly, in allowing the judicial review, in Canto 
Rodriguez,64 another case regarding a Mexican claimant 
who was abused by her ex-boyfriend, Justice Russell noted 
that the “Board pointed out that Mexico is a democracy 
with functioning political and judicial systems . The burden 
on the Applicant to rebut the presumption of state protec-
tion was heavy .”65 In his analysis, he held that the Board did 
not do enough to address evidence concerning the ineffec-
tuality of police action in a context where the claimant was 
under daily threats from an influential perpetrator who, in 
addition to wanting to harm the claimant, showed no hesi-
tation in threatening the police themselves .66 Also, Justice 
Russell pointed out that there was contradictory evidence 
before the Board that women are not protected in Mexico by 
the police and the criminal justice system generally .67
Justice Shore applied a similar line of reasoning in 
Bravo Tamayo,68 when he allowed an application for judi-
cial review of a Mexican claimant’s refugee decision that 
involved domestic abuse . Relying on the case of Avila,69 
Justice Shore held that “the Board must undertake a proper 
analysis of the situation in the country and the particular 
reasons” why the claimant is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection in the country of nation-
ality or habitual residence .70 Further, in quoting Avila, the 
Court held that the Board must consider not only whether 
the state has the capacity to protect but also their willing-
ness to act . In particular:
In this regard, the legislation and procedures which the applicant 
may use to obtain state protection may reflect the will of the state . 
However, they do not suffice in themselves to establish the reality 
of protection unless they are given effect in practice … . 71
In a number of Federal Court decisions, the factors that 
the Court expects Board members to look at when deter-
mining whether there is state protection for women who 
have suffered domestic violence have nothing to do with 
how a country governs itself . Rather, the focus has been on 
police responses to complaints of domestic violence .72
Indeed, as Justice Campbell of the Federal Court has 
stated in Garcia, “serious efforts” to protect women through 
“due diligence” in the form of commissions of inquiry 
investigating issues regarding violence against women, the 
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creation of ombudspersons to take complaints of police fail-
ure, or educational initiatives do not constitute evidence of 
“effective state protection .”73 Justice Campbell also rational-
ized that the existence of non-governmental agencies such 
as women’s shelters are not signs of effective state protection, 
citing that the Board’s own “Gender Guidelines” agree .74 
The Court posited that there should not be a burden on the 
claimant to seek protection from these agencies .75 “Serious 
efforts,” Justice Campbell states, “must be viewed at the oper-
ational level of the protection services offered by the state .”76 
Essentially, the ability of the state to protect must be seen 
not only through effective legislation and procedural frame-
work, but also through the capacity and will to implement 
them .77 Justice Campbell provides an illustration:
For example, when a woman calls the police at 3:00 am to say 
that her estranged husband is coming through the window, the 
question is, are the police ready, willing, and able to make ser-
ious efforts to arrive in time to protect her from being killed? 
While it is true that even the best trained, educated, and prop-
erly motivated police force might not arrive in time, the test for 
“serious efforts” will only be met where it is established that the 
force’s capability and expertise is developed well enough to make 
a credible, earnest attempt to do so, from both the perspective of 
the woman involved and the concerned community . The same 
test applies to the help that a woman might be expected to receive 
at the complaint counter at a local police station . That is, are the 
police capable of accepting and acting on her complaint in a cred-
ible and earnest manner? Indeed, in my opinion, this is the test 
that should not only be applied to a state’s “serious efforts” to pro-
tect women but should be accepted as the appropriate test with 
respect to all protection contexts .78
Justice Campbell in this case asks for particular evidence 
of whether effective state protection will be available; he 
calls for an examination of whether a woman calling for 
help in a domestic violence situation would get the help she 
needed, at the operational level . There is no reason to exam-
ine whether the country is democratic or not . At the heart 
of the examination is whether, there is state protection in 
practice, not whether there is in theory . In order to come to 
a sound conclusion, the factor of democracy is not helpful . 
As in the case studies of looking at claimants claiming by 
reason of the fact that they cannot be protected by perpe-
trators of domestic violence, it is a personal analysis that 
not only needs to be done, but an analysis of the protection 
mechanisms in that country . The voting system of a country 
should not be a factor in a determination of whether a state 
can protect a particular individual whatsoever .
While many cases make the presumption that if a state 
is democratic, there is effective state protection,79 other 
jurisprudence, however, has begun to challenge the very 
notion of the character of an government system informing 
as to the effectiveness of state protection in a refugee con-
text . Indeed in Katwaru, the Federal Court opined:
The Board also relied on Kadenko … for the proposition that the 
burden for the claimant to prove an absence of state protection 
is directly proportional to the level of democracy of the state . 
Democracy alone does not guarantee effective state protection; it 
is merely an indicator of the likely effectiveness of a state institu-
tion . In the present case, the evidence indicates that the Guyana 
Police Force is a very weak institution that is having real difficul-
ties responding to the high levels of violent crime that exist in 
the Country as a whole . The Board is required to do more than 
determine whether a country has a democratic political system 
and must assess the quality of the institutions that provide state 
protection .80
Despite the efforts of the judiciary to rein in the use of the 
democracy factor in evaluating whether effective state pro-
tection exists, should asylum countries, such as Canada, be 
using this factor at all in its determination of whether one is 
deserving of refugee protection?
Judicial Notice of Democracy
While recognizing that the Board is an adjudicative body 
that is deemed to have specialized knowledge, and a body 
that does not apply rules of evidence as strictly as the courts, 
there is still an obligation for Board members to make find-
ings upon a sound foundation .
The problem with recognizing democracy as a barometer 
of whether state protection is available is best illustrated by 
looking at how the democracy factor is applied in decision 
making . Whether as specialized knowledge or as judicial 
notice, the application of the assumption that a democratic 
nation can provide “clear and convincing” evidence that 
there is effective state protection, in general, does not adhere 
to legal norms of how judicial notice should be applied . 
Paciocco and Stuesser define judicial notice as follows:
Judicial notice is the acceptance by a court, without the require-
ment of proof, of any fact or matter that is so generally known 
and accepted by the community that it cannot be reasonably ques-
tioned, or any fact or matter that can readily be determined or 
verified by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned .81
Judicial notice is given to facts that are already known 
and acknowledges the vast knowledge, understanding, and 
experience that adjudicators are expected to use; it basically 
dispenses with proof . Judicial notice is a mechanism that 
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constitutes an exception to the general rule that matters of 
fact are established by the introduction of evidence or by 
admission .82 Examples that Paciocco and Stuesser provide 
include:
We know that children can drown in lakes; we need no proof of 
that . We also know that alcohol can impair a person’s faculties; we 
need no proof of that . Much is simply accepted as part of human 
experience, as a matter of common sense, for which no proof is 
needed and to which nothing is said . When the silence is broken 
and the acceptance of a matter of common knowledge is urged or 
disputed, the issue of judicial notice arises . 83
Essentially, judicial notice dispenses with the need for 
proof of facts that are clearly uncontroversial or beyond 
reasonable dispute . Facts that are judicially noticed are not 
proven by evidence or tested, and therefore the threshold 
for judicial notice is strict . Courts will accept a fact with-
out proof if (a) it is so notorious or generally accepted as 
not to be the subject of debate among reasonable persons; 
or (b) it is capable of immediate and accurate demonstra-
tion by resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable 
accuracy .84
Paciocco and Stuesser also distinguish between taking 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts, legislative facts, and 
social framework facts . They define “adjudicative facts” as 
those facts “to be determined in the litigation between the 
parties .”85 “Legislative facts” are those that “assist in deter-
mining questions of law and are not intended to assist in 
resolving questions of fact .”86 “Social framework facts” are 
defined as those that “provide a context for the judge to con-
sider and apply the evidence in a given case .”87 They also 
describe social framework facts as “a hybrid of adjudicative 
and legislative facts” and “social science research that is 
used to construct a frame of reference or background con-
text for deciding factual issues crucial to the resolution of a 
particular case .”88
Arguably, taking judicial notice of whether a country is a 
democracy would be a social framework fact . The warning 
that Paciocco and Stuesser provide with this kind of judi-
cial notice is apt: “in the absence of evidence, reliance on 
such general propositions simply leads to inappropriate and 
unfair speculation” or “stereotyping .”89
Interestingly, Paciocco and Stuesser note that judicial 
notice and expert evidence are not compatible: “Judicial 
notice, as outlined, deals with matters of notorious common 
knowledge; on the other hand, expert evidence is called pre-
cisely because the expert has knowledge beyond the ken of 
the ordinary person .”90
Indeed, the Federal Court has recognized the above prin-
ciples with regard to judicial notice and upheld the stan-
dards set out in R . v . Find .91 For example in Kankanagme:
… judicial notice dispenses with the need for proof of facts that 
are clearly uncontroversial or beyond reasonable dispute . Because 
facts judicially noted are not taken under oath or subject to cross-
examination, the threshold for the admission of facts by judicial 
notice is strict . To be admissible, the facts must be either “so 
notorious or generally accepted as to be not the subject of debate 
among reasonable persons; or … capable of immediate and 
accurate demonstration by resort to readily accessible sources of 
indisputable accuracy .”
As an administrative tribunal, the Immigration and Refugee 
Board is not bound by the stringent evidentiary rules applicable 
in a criminal case . Nevertheless, I am not persuaded that the etiol-
ogy of speech impediments is something of which the Board could 
properly take notice . In purporting to take notice of this ‘fact,’ the 
Board committed a further error .92
Similarly, in the case of Castro, the Federal Court stated:
According to the Respondent, the Applicant is asking the Court 
to take judicial notice that there has been an increase in crimes 
in Mexico, therefore rendering it a dangerous place for anyone . 
Judicial notice may be taken of any fact of matter which is so 
generally known and accepted that it cannot reasonably be ques-
tioned, or any fact of matter which can readily be determined or 
verified by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably 
questioned … . 93
Perhaps most pertinent to the discussion is the decision 
of H .K . wherein the Federal Court was reviewing a decision 
by a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) officer regarding 
an applicant from India . In rendering the decision, the Court 
held that the “situation in India, or in any other country” 
is a question of fact . The Court recognized that the PRRA 
officer is not subject to strict rules of evidence but provided 
that judicial notice should only be given to facts that “are so 
notorious as not to be subject of dispute among reasonable 
people” and facts that “everybody knows .”94 The Court held 
that the particular facts provided to the PRRA officer were 
not those deserving judicial notice, and also that the govern-
ment had not recognized that India was in a horrific situa-
tion where a moratorium was issued .95
The problem with the Board, in effect, taking judicial 
notice of a country as having a democratic political system 
to impute that state protection is available, is that in doing 
so, it is essentially engaging in what Paciocco and Stuesser 
warn against: unfair speculation and stereotyping . The 
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consequence of such a practice is that the finding of whether 
there is effective state protection becomes the same for all 
individuals, regardless of their particular circumstance .
It is the distinction between judicial notice and expert 
evidence that illustrates the problem with the use of the 
democracy factor in assessing effective state protection . The 
Supreme Court of Canada in Ward has made it clear that 
the burden of proof as to whether there is effective state pro-
tection is one where there must be “clear and convincing” 
evidence . Board members and judges alike have become 
accustomed to being presented with country documenta-
tion or expert evidence about a country’s response to a par-
ticular threat that an individual claimant describes, and the 
expectation should not be discouraged . The determination 
of whether the presumption that there is state protection 
should be rebutted is a question of mixed fact and law, and 
not one that should be easily dispensed with by judicial 
notice .
The Problem with Defining Democracy
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “democracy” as: gov-
ernment by all the people, direct or representative . It also 
notes that democracy derives from the Greek word demos 
which means people .
This definition demonstrates that, at its core, “democ-
racy” is a noun that describes a form of government . By this 
definition alone, it seems illogical that adjudicators would 
rely upon the form of a government of a country to indicate 
whether it can effectively protect its citizens . However, pol-
itical theory divulges more .
Ironically, when proponents of democracy were promot-
ing the use of its form in ancient Greek times, others, like 
Plato, were skeptical of the benefits it could bring to society . 
Rule of the many was viewed as inefficient or it was thought 
that only a few were fit to rule . The notion of democracy 
has evolved since Plato’s time, and indeed many others have 
provided their philosophical perspectives as to whether it 
is an appropriate way for society to be governed . Today, it is 
widely held to be the preferred way to govern, and indeed 
is the form of government most promoted .
Today, there are many forms of democratic government, 
including representative, parliamentary, direct, and others . 
Indeed, not only the forms of democratic governments have 
evolved but theories surrounding the study of democracies 
have evolved as well . These studies inform the problems 
associated with how we define democracy .
Indeed, political scientists have tried to wrap their minds 
around the very characteristics that make up a democratic 
country . Robert Dahl asks:
Democracy means, literally, rule by the people . But what does it 
mean to say that the people rule, the people is sovereign, a people 
governs itself? In order to rule, the people must have some way of 
ruling, a process for ruling . What are the distinctive characteris-
tics of a democratic process of government?96
Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant examined their 
colleagues’ assessments and have found that there are many 
ways in which one can examine whether a state is demo-
cratic or not:
[Some scholars discussed democracy in its most simple construct: 
Schumpeter, Dahl and Przeworski] They reduced democracy to 
the question of free and general electoral competition, vertical 
accountability and the fact that the most powerful political and 
social actors played the political game according to democratic-
ally institutionalized rules . At least implicitly, democracy was 
conceived as an elitist electoral democracy . Neither the struc-
tural question of prerequisites for democracy nor the conditions 
for sustainable legitimacy played and could play a relevant role 
within this minimalist concept of the sustainability of democ-
racy . But not only the external ‘embedding’ of democracy, but also 
the ‘internal’ embeddedness of the democratic electoral regime 
was neglected . Rule of law, civil rights and horizontal account-
ability were excluded from the concept of democracy . Guillermo 
O’Donnell (1993) was the first to criticize that conceptual flaw of 
the mainstream of transitology and consolidology . Thirty years 
after the beginning of the third wave of democratization empir-
ical evidence revealed the theoretical shortcomings of the min-
imalist ‘electoralists .’ It became evident that it is misleading to 
subsume Denmark, Sweden or France under the same type of 
regime—an electoral democracy—as Russia, Thailand or Brazil . 
Political science ran the risk of even falling behind the analytical 
capacity of daily newspapers in differentiating between different 
types of democracy . 97
Much has been written about the rise of the number of 
democratic states since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
but only recently have the newly democratic states been 
given a second glance . Fareed Zakaria asserts that identify-
ing as a democracy may not mean that a state espouses the 
characteristics one normally associates with a democracy . 
He writes:
The American diplomat Richard Holbrook pondered a problem 
on the eve of the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, which were 
meant to restore civil life to that ravaged country . “Suppose the 
election was declared free and fair,” he said, and those elected 
are “racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to 
[peace and reintegration] . That is the dilemma .” Indeed it is, 
not just in the former Yugoslavia, but increasingly around the 
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world . Democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been 
reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring 
constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of 
basic rights and freedoms . From Peru to the Palestinian Authority, 
from Sierra Leone to Slovakia, from Pakistan to the Philippines, 
we see the rise of a disturbing phenomenon in international life—
illiberal democracy .
It has been difficult to recognize this problem because for almost a 
century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy—a 
political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but 
also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protec-
tion of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property . 
In fact, this latter bundle of freedoms—what might be termed 
constitutional liberalism—is theoretically different and historic-
ally distinct from democracy … Today the two strands of liberal 
democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming 
apart in the rest of the world . Democracy is flourishing, constitu-
tional liberalism is not .
Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy 
does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism . In contrast to 
the Western and East Asian paths, during the last two decades in 
Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia, dictatorships with little 
background in constitutional liberalism have given way to democ-
racy . The results are not encouraging .98
Zakaria articulates the problem with adjudicators rely-
ing on the classification of “democratic” as a starting point 
in an analysis of the state’s ability to effectively protect its 
citizens . We can no longer rely on the fact that democracy 
means “liberal democracy .” These days, it may also mean 
“illiberal democracy .”
Beyond that, other political scientists are questioning 
whether democracy should have been promoted . Merkel 
and Croissant state:
It became clear that the majority of new democracies could not 
be labeled “liberal democracies .” General, competitive and free 
elections turned out to be insufficient in guaranteeing the rule of 
law, civil rights and horizontal accountability . Between elections, 
many of the electoral democracies were not government by, of or 
for the people . It became obvious, again, that democratic elections 
need the support of complementary partial regimes, such as the 
rule of law, horizontal accountability and an open public sphere 
in order to become ‘meaningful’ elections . 99
Interestingly, Merkel and Croissant opine:
We argue that defective democracies are the most frequent type 
of democracy found among the almost 100 new democracies 
which emerged during the third wave of democratization . We 
therefore need a clearer conceptual understanding of the charac-
ter, sources of legitimacy, institutions and mode of reproduction 
of this regime type in order to analyse, explain and predict the 
emergence, durability and trajectory of defective democracies .100
They describe defective democracies as having some 
common characteristics . The first characteristic is that these 
democracies carry out elections; the second is a deficient 
implementation of the rule of law and horizontal account-
ability; the third is the existence of powerful political groups 
that drive the agenda; and the fourth is low-intensity cit-
izenship or “weak stateness .”101
Koelble and Lipuma also question the way that democ-
racy is measured and how the label is given to countries—
labels given by organizations such as Freedom House and 
others that the Board and refugee lawyers rely upon . Their 
research critically analyzes the ongoing projects designed to 
quantify and gauge the quality of democracy and the per-
formance of national governance . They discuss the limita-
tions of measurement and the methodologies used to arrive 
at the determination of whether one country is democratic 
and on what scale .102
The authors state that current measurements are well-
attuned to Euro-American realities and “fail to adequately 
capture the differences that are (and have been) shaping 
the character of postcolonial democracies .”103 They posit 
that the means of measuring democracy is flawed because 
it fails to adequately grasp the way in which democracy as 
a concept and form of governance becomes reterritorial-
ized in local/national contexts .104 Interestingly, they make 
the finding that the real measure of democracy is the extent 
to which governance conforms to the visions of democracy 
worked out by the governed .
If we are to use this definition, arguably the act of refu-
gees leaving their country would demonstrate that they are 
dissatisfied with the way their country is being governed—
is that enough?
Carothers takes this further and questions whether dem-
ocratization or “open national elections” is always a good 
idea . He provides that when tried in poor countries, dem-
ocracy can and does result in bad outcomes such as illiberal 
leaders or extremists .105  Like Carothers, there is a growing 
body of those who question whether promoting democracy 
really leads to good . Faundez states that positive develop-
ments brought by democratization are offset by the quality 
of governance and at the expense of other things:
One of the factors triggering political disaffection is, arguably, the 
failure of new democratic regimes to resolve pressing social and 
economic problems of vast sections of their population . Although 
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democracy aims mainly at guaranteeing political and civil equal-
ity, pervasive economic inequalities have a negative impact on the 
capacity of citizens to exercise their democratic rights . The danger 
posed by this situation is that populist leaders or sectarian groups 
could take advantage of democracy’s freedom to undermine, dis-
credit or overthrow its institutions . 106
Finally, scholars like William Robinson question the true 
aims of “democracy promotion”:
When transnational elites talk about “democracy promotion” 
what they really mean is the promotion of polyarchy . I use the 
term to refer to a system in which a small group actually rules, 
and mass participation in decision making is confined to choos-
ing leaders in elections that are carefully managed by competing 
elites .107
Robinson goes further and provides that “democracy pro-
motion” does not lead to the characteristics many think 
come with it, such as rule of law or greater access to rights 
for individuals . He states: “the trappings of democratic pro-
cedure in a polyarchic political system do not mean that 
the lives of ordinary people become filled with authentic or 
meaningful democratic content, much less that social jus-
tice or greater economic equality is achieved .”108 Rather, the 
“transitions to democracy” become a mechanism to facilitate 
the rise to power of groups of elites .109 He also argues that 
rather than bring the expected benefits, democracy promo-
tion leads to problems other scholars have noticed:
Transitions to polyarchy have been accompanied by a dramatic 
sharpening of inequalities and social polarization, as well as 
growth in poverty … Added to the income polarization in the 
1980s and 1990s was the dramatic deterioration in social condi-
tions as a result of neoliberal policies that drastically reduced and 
privatized health, education and other social programs .110
Robinson, in particular, highlighted that the position 
of many Latin American countries, including Mexico, 
decreased on the United Nations Development Program’s 
Human Development Index during the period of “democ-
racy promotion” and that what really happened in Mexico 
and other Latin American countries was “intraelite conflict” 
rather than a true democratic reforms .111
What is clear is that while many academics and research-
ers have debated (a) the best way to measure democracy 
and (b) the value of promoting democracy, two things 
have become clear for those working in the refugee legal 
system in Canada . First, calling a state democratic is not 
an easy exercise . Simply saying a country is democratic is 
not informative to whether there are structures in place, 
or informative of the attitude or will of a state to provide 
effective state protection . The fact that it is difficult to dis-
cern what it means to be a democracy suggests that it would 
be wrong to assume that all Board members or adjudicators 
are using the same methods to determine whether a state is 
democratic, or, indeed, where that state may fit on a spec-
trum that has not been fully defined .  
The danger here is applying the rules of judicial notice to 
a notion that is not fit to be judicially noticed . The above dis-
cussion that academics and researchers are having illustrates 
that the finding that a state is democratic is not “uncontro-
versial” or “beyond reasonable dispute .” As well, there is no 
capability of “immediate and accurate demonstration by 
resort to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy,” 
as the above dialogue demonstrates, to define democracy, 
let alone identify whether a country is democratic .
Second, beyond the problem of defining democracy, and 
defining which states belong in that definition, one needs 
to question whether this is a factor that helps in determin-
ing whether the presumption of state protection is rebutted 
in a particular case . Academics such as Zakaria have chal-
lenged the idyllic notion that democracy brings with it the 
rule of law and systemic protections . As well, academics 
such as Faundez and Robinson question whether democra-
cies today provide of the protections of civil, social, and eco-
nomic rights that are often assumed to be associated with 
democratic countries . The larger picture is that while we as 
advocates and adjudicators in the Canadian refugee system 
are seeking ways to get to a determination in an efficient 
and easy-to-use manner, the democracy factor does neither . 
Instead, it is distorting our notions of what is effective state 
protection, and deflecting attention from other factors that 
may be more appropriate . As noted by the Committee on 
Population and Refugees of the Council of Europe:
… the concept of persecution should be interpreted and applied 
liberally and also adapted to the changed circumstances which 
may differ considerably from those existing when the Convention 
was originally adopted … . [A]ccount should be taken of the rela-
tion between refugee status and the denial of human rights as laid 
down in different international instruments .112
While much of the jurisprudence has held that when a 
state is democratic, the evidence necessary to rebut the pre-
sumption of state protection will need to be higher, some 
judges have tried to provide a more nuanced approach in 
the hopes of preventing the pigeon-hole effect of assuming 
that every person from a certain country would not be a 
refugee . The result is that there is confusing jurisprudence 
pertaining to the same country and no distinguishable way 
to discern why .
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This is aptly demonstrated in the case of Flores Zepeda113 
in the Federal Court wherein Justice Tremblay-Lamer 
referred to a series of cases demonstrating the problem in 
using democracy as a barometer for state protection . Justice 
Tremblay-Lamer first points to a case relied upon by the 
respondent called Velazquez . The Court in Velazquez stated 
that “Mexico is a functioning democracy, and a member of 
the NAFTA, with democratic institutions .” 114 From this, 
the Court in Velazquez reasoned that the presumption of 
state protection is “a strong one .”115
Justice Tremblay-Lamer then examines other juris-
prudence that “focused on the problems that remain in 
Mexico’s democracy .”116 In De Leon, the Court indicated 
that Mexico was “a developing democracy with problems 
including corruption and drug trafficking involving state 
authorities .” This reasoning led the Court in De Leon to find 
that the presumption of state protection in Mexico “more 
easily overturned .”117
Justice Tremblay-Lamer then refers to Capitaine118 
wherein the Court held that “Mexico is a democracy to 
which a presumption of state protection applies” but that 
“its place on the ‘democracy spectrum’ needs to be assessed” 
to determine what evidence will displace that presump-
tion .119 The Court in Capitaine held that all countries on 
the “democracy spectrum” do not get the same treatment 
and that decision makers are not relieved of their obligation 
to “assess the evidence offered” to establish whether or not a 
state is able to protect its citizens .120
In conclusion, Justice Tremblay-Lamer agreed with the 
approach in Capitaine and provides in her reasons:
While Mexico is a democracy and generally willing to protect its 
citizens, its governance and corruption problems are well docu-
mented . Accordingly, decision-makers must engage in a full 
assessment of the evidence placed before them suggesting that 
Mexico, while willing to protect, may be unable to do so . This 
assessment should include the context of the country of origin in 
general, all the steps that the applicants did in fact take, and their 
interaction with the authorities .121
The case of Flores-Zepeda is but one example illustrating 
the perils of using democracy as the principle measure of 
determining whether there is effective state protection in a 
particular country . The application of reference to the demo-
cratic nature of a country leads to an overgeneralization of 
the assessments of state protection and the danger is that 
such an assessment may lead adjudicators to assume that in 
all cases from that country, there is effective state protec-
tion . This begs the question of why we need the first step . Is 
it helpful to know what political system the country uses to 
govern itself in all cases? Unless it is raised by a claimant, 
the focus should be on the other factors that adjudicators 
have focused on when they try to get around the generalized 
finding that a state has state protection simply because it is 
“democratic .”
Policy Recommendation: Bringing Back to Basics 
and Taking Democracy out of the Equation
This paper urges Canadian decision makers in the refugee 
system to adopt a bold position . While there is a movement 
to recognizing tools that create efficiency and ease in mak-
ing determinations, relying on such tools should not be at 
the expense of those who are vulnerable . We, as advocates, 
should also be mindful of protecting the very legal trad-
itions that ensure that abuses are not allowed nor rights dis-
missed . In particular, while we can recognize that tribunals 
such as the Immigration and Refugee Board are those that 
do not adhere to strict rules of evidence, the rules should 
not be abandoned altogether, and those that do exist should 
not be distorted . Using the factor of democracy to help in 
determining whether there is effective state protection does 
nothing but distort the picture in which the claimant is tell-
ing his/her story . It does nothing to help in the examina-
tion of evidence of whether there is effective state  protection . 
Instead adjudicators and advocates alike should call for a 
more honest investigation, looking at the personal and 
particular factors that may illustrate whether or not that 
claimant would be given protection . In the case of a woman 
who has suffered from domestic abuse, it is not the regime 
in which the country is run that will inform, but the pro-
tection services in place, and the political will to deal with 
perpetrators of domestic violence . Claimants from a certain 
country that claim on political persecution may not be suc-
cessful due to the protection afforded in that situation . This 
protection may not be applied similarly or the same to other 
groups of people, namely women in domestic violence situa-
tions or those who identify as gay or lesbian . Whatever, the 
case, we cannot start with the democratic nature, because 
it does nothing to inform the reality in which each claim-
ant finds herself or himself . As well, it may be a factor that 
biases a decision maker when examining cases that involve 
marginalized communities from a particular country .
In essence, the paper calls for the abolishment of the 
practice of using the “democracy factor” as a gatekeeper 
to the adjudicator from examining evidence to rebut the 
presumption of state protection . Advocates should chal-
lenge any attempt by the government to deem any country a 
“designated country” based on the fact that it is a so-called 
“democracy .” There is already a burden on refugee claimants 
to provide “clear and convincing” evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption of state protection . Whether or not a state is demo-
cratic should not increase the burden . It is not informative 
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to the task at hand, and it generalizes claims from a particu-
lar country . It takes away from the original notion of why 
the international community decided to recognize and pro-
tect refugees . The democracy factor is a dangerous preced-
ent . Any policy which promotes the notion that claimants 
from certain countries could never be refugees represents a 
serious threat to both the letter and the spirit of the Refugee 
Convention .
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